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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“I have never had the terror that I feel everyday when I walk down the streets of 
Chicago . . . I have had my windows broken out.  I have had guns pulled on me . . . I 
get intimidated on a daily basis, and it’s come to the point where I say, well, do I go 
out today.”1  Such is one of many accounts that led Chicago to pass the Gang 
Congregation Ordinance2 which prohibited loitering by gang members on city 
streets.  Throughout history and in recent years, similar laws have been passed in 
many cities in the United States3.  And in most all recent cases, the constitutionality 
of such statutes has been challenged, some surviving while others failing.4  On June 
10, 1999, the United States Supreme Court in City of Chicago v. Morales struck 
down the Chicago loitering ordinance,5 adding it to the growing list of loitering 
                                                                
1Transcript of Proceedings before the City Council of Chicago, Committee on Police and 
Fire 66-67 (May 15, 1997 on file with Author). 
2CHICAGO MUNICIPAL CODE ' 8-4-015 (added June 17, 1992). 
3For a historical account of loitering laws, see C. RIBTON-TURNER, A HISTORY OF 
VAGRANTS AND VAGRANCY AND BEGGARS AND BEGGING (1972).  For a treatment of recent 
court cases interpreting various local loitering statutes, see Peter W. Poulos, Chicago’s Ban on 
Gang Loitering: Making Sense of Vagueness Overbreadth in Loitering Laws, 83 CAL L. REV. 
379 (1995). 
4For example, in City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 827 P.2d 1374 (Wash. 1992), the Washington 
Supreme Court upheld the validity of an ordinance prohibiting loitering by individuals who 
manifest an intent to sell drugs.  Conversely, one year later in Wyche v. State of Florida, 619 
So.2d 231 (Fla. 1993), the Florida Supreme Court struck down a Tampa ordinance that 
prohibited loitering by individuals who manifest an intent to engage in prostitution. 
5City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999). 
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statutes deemed constitutionally deficient.  However, this decision did not sound the 
death knell for all loitering statutes.  Rather, the Court has emphasized and defined 
strict limits that must be placed on them in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
This Comment examines Morales and the Court’s treatment of anti-gang 
loitering statutes under the vagueness doctrine.  Part II examines the City of 
Chicago’s attempt to tackle the problem of gangs terrorizing its citizens and how the 
Illinois courts dealt with the ordinance.  Part III then examines the reasons for the 
United States Supreme Court invalidating the ordinance, with equal emphasis placed 
on all the Justice’s opinions.  Part IV then analyzes the implications of the Court’s 
decision, criticizing the plurality’s creation of a fundamental right to loiter and 
demonstrating how the ordinance survives a vagueness challenge. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Chicago’s Attempt to Tackle Gangs 
Prior to the adoption of the gang loitering ordinance, the City Council’s 
Committee on Police and Fire held hearings to explore the problems that criminal 
street gangs present for the City of Chicago.  Testimony by witnesses revealed how 
gang members loiter as part of a strategy to claim territory and recruit new members.  
Further testimony revealed that street gangs are responsible for a variety of criminal 
activity, including drive-by shootings, drug dealing, and vandalism.6  Additionally, 
street gangs were accused of being menacing and intimidating regardless of whether 
their members are violating any other laws at that particular moment.7 
In response to these concerns, Chicago passed the Gang Congregation Ordinance 
which prohibited gang members from loitering in a public place.8  The pertinent 
portion of the gang loitering ordinance provides: 
                                                                
6Petitioner=s Brief at 10, City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (No. 97-1121). 
7Id. 
8The city council incorporated its findings in the preamble of the ordinance, as follows: 
WHEREAS, The City of Chicago, like other cities across the nation, has been 
experiencing an increasing murder rate as well as an increase in violent and drug 
related crimes; and 
WHEREAS, The City Council has determined that the continuing increase in criminal 
street gang activity in the City is largely responsible for this unacceptable situation; 
and 
WHEREAS, In many neighborhoods throughout the City, the burgeoning presence of 
street gang members in public places has intimidated many law abiding citizens; and 
WHEREAS, One of the methods by which criminal street gangs establish control over 
identifiable areas is by loitering in those areas and intimidating others from entering 
those areas; and 
WHEREAS, Members of criminal street gangs avoid arrest by committing no offense 
punishable under existing laws when they know the police are present, while 
maintaining control over identifiable areas by continued loitering; and 
WHEREAS, The City Council has determined that loitering in public places by 
criminal street gang members creates a justifiable fear for the safety of persons and 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss1/18
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(a) Whenever a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably 
believes to be a criminal street gang member loitering in any public place 
with one or more other persons, he shall order all such persons to disperse 
and remove themselves from the area.  Any person who does not promptly 
obey such an order is in violation of this section. 
(b) It shall be an affirmative defense to an alleged violation of this section 
that no person who was observed loitering was in fact a member of a 
criminal street gang.9 
The ordinance remained in effect for three years, during which time police issued 
over 89,000 dispersal orders and arrested over 42,000 people for violations under the 
ordinance.10  The trial courts immediately became divided as to its constitutionality.  
Two trial judges upheld the law, whereas eleven others ruled it invalid.11  The city 
eventually stopped enforcing the law when the Illinois Appellate Court ruled it 
invalid.  In overturning several convictions, the court found that it was 
unconstitutionally vague, it improperly criminalized status rather than conduct, and it 
jeopardized rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment.12 
B.  The Illinois Supreme Court  
The Illinois Supreme affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, finding that 
the anti-gang loitering ordinance violated due process of law because it was 
impermissibly vague on its face.13  It identified two criteria that must be met for a 
                                                          
property in the area because of the violence, drug-dealing and vandalism often 
associated with such activity; and 
WHEREAS, The City also has an interest in discouraging all persons from loitering in 
public places with criminal gang members; and 
WHEREAS, Aggressive action is necessary to preserve the city=s streets and other 
public places so that the public may use such places without fear[.] 
 
CHICAGO MUNICIPAL CODE ' 8-4-015. 
9Id.  The ordinance defined loiter as to “remain in any one place with no apparent 
purpose.” Id.  Criminal street gang means “any ongoing organization, association in fact or 
group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its substantial 
activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated in paragraph (3), and 
whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal 
gang activity.”  Id.  Finally, public place means “the public way and any other location open to 
the public, whether publicly or privately owned.”  Id.  A violation of the ordinance was 
punishable by up to six months imprisonment, a $500 fine, and up to 120 hours of community 
service.  See Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 6, at 10-11. 
10Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 6, at 16. 
11Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 6, at 16. 
12See Chicago v. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d 34 (Ill. 1995).  The case consolidated several 
other cases pending under the loitering ordinance. 
13Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 58 (Ill. 1997).  Because the court was able to strike down the 
ordinance based solely on the vagueness issue, it did not bother to pass judgment on whether 
the ordinance creates a status offense, permits arrests without probable cause, or is overbroad. 
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statute to satisfy the vagueness doctrine.  First, a criminal statute must be sufficiently 
definite so that it gives persons of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to 
distinguish between lawful and unlawful conduct.14  Second, a penal statute must 
adequately define the criminal offense in such a manner that does not encourage 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.15 
The Court held that the first criterion of the vagueness doctrine (sufficient clarity 
for ordinary citizens) was not met.  The court noted that the ordinance seeks to 
criminalize acts of loitering in a public place.  “The infirmity with this type of 
prohibition is that it fails to distinguish between innocent conduct and conduct 
calculated to cause harm and makes criminal activities which by modern standards 
are normally innocent.”16  While most persons of ordinary intelligence maintain a 
common and accepted meaning of the word loiter, “such term by itself is inadequate 
to inform a citizen of its criminal implications.”17 
The court also found the ordinance’s stated definition of the word “loiter”—
remaining in one place with no apparent purpose—to be inarticulate in describing the 
proscriptions of the ordinance.  “People with entirely legitimate and lawful purposes 
will not always be able to make their purposes apparent to an observing police 
officer.  For example, a person waiting to hail a taxi, resting on a corner during a jog, 
or stepping into a doorway to evade a rain shower has a perfectly legitimate purpose 
in all these scenarios; however, that purpose will rarely be apparent to an observer.”18 
In the Court’s view, the second criterion―not encouraging arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement―was also not met.  The definition of loitering “provides 
absolute discretion to police officers to decide what activities constitute loitering.”19  
Furthermore, because police are given complete discretion to determine whether any 
members of a group are gang members, “[t]hese guidelines do not conform with 
accepted standards for defining a criminal offense.”20  It suggested that the ordinance 
was drawn intentionally broad in order that police be able to “sweep these intolerable 
and objectionable gang members from the city streets.”21  This, in the Court’s eyes, 
created an unfettered opportunity for abuse, and therefore could not stand. 
                                                                
14Id. at 60.  See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). 
15Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 60. 
16Id. at 60-61 (quoting Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163 (1972)). 
17Id. at 61. 
18Id.  Courts in several other jurisdictions have found similarly worded prohibitions of 
criminal loitering statutes unconstitutionally vague.  See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 
U.S. 283 (1975); United States ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166 (2d Cir. 1974); 
Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974). 
19Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 63. 
20Id. 
21Id. at 64. 
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III.  THE SUPREME COURT 
Overview 
A six justice majority of the U.S. Supreme Court had little difficulty in finding 
constitutional deficiencies that warranted striking down the Chicago ordinance.  All 
of the majority justices agreed that the ordinance was impermissibly vague because 
the broad sweep of the ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement.22  For one, the ordinance's mandatory language directed the police to 
issue a dispersal order without making any inquiry about the possible purposes of 
persons who stood or sat in the company of a gang member.  The ordinance also 
required no harmful purpose and applied to non-gang members as well as suspected 
gang members, and police guidelines did not sufficiently limit the discretion granted 
to the police in enforcing the ordinance.  Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg 
expressed the view that the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is part of the 
liberty protected by the due process clause,23 whereas Justices O’Connor and Breyer 
were primarily concerned that the ordinance lacked sufficient minimal standards to 
guide law enforcement officers.24 
In dissent, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Rehnquist rejected the argument that the 
ordinance is unconstitutionally vague, insisting that it was perfectly reasonable and 
placed specific limits on when officers can make arrests.25  Most strongly of all, the 
dissent criticized the majority for creating a fundamental right to loiter, as loitering 
has been consistently criminalized throughout the nation's history.26 
A.  Justice Stevens’ Opinion: Vagueness and the Fundamental Right to Loiter 
The only substantive portion of Justice Stevens’ opinion which garnered a 
majority support was the fifth section which concluded that the broad sweep of the 
ordinance violated the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to 
govern law enforcement because the language directs the police to issue a dispersal 
order without first inquiring as to a purpose.27  The fact that the ordinance does not 
permit an arrest until after a dispersal order has been disobeyed does not provide any 
guidance to the officer in deciding whether an order should ensue.  The "no apparent 
purpose" standard is too subjective because its application depends on whether some 
                                                                
22City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, Syllabus (1999). 
23Id. at Syllabus para. 1. 
24Id. at Syllabus. 
25Id. at 89-96. 
26Id. at 102-04. 
27Morales, 527 U.S. at 60-61.  In one of the more colorful portions of his opinion, Justice 
Stevens illustrated the point by saying that it  
matters not whether the reason that a gang member and his father, for example, might 
loiter near Wrigley Field is to rob an unsuspecting fan or just to get a glimpse of 
Sammy Sosa leaving the ballpark; in either event, if their purpose is not apparent to a 
nearby police officer, she mayBindeed, she ‘shall’Border them to disperse. 
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purpose is apparent to the officer.28  Furthermore, although the ordinance requires the 
officer to reasonably believe that a group of loiterers contains a gang member, the 
dispersal order applies to non-gang members as well.29  According to Justice 
Stevens, “[f]riends, relatives, teachers, counselors, or even total strangers” may be 
subject to an arbitrary dispersal order simply by virtue of association with a gang 
member.30  Ultimately, because this ordinance “affords too much discretion to the 
police and too little notice to citizens who wish to use the public streets,” a majority 
of the Court struck it down.31  
The other portions of Justice Stevens’ central argument comprised a plurality 
opinion, beginning in part III which only Justices Souter and Ginsburg joined.  He 
began by noting the legitimacy of the City Council’s findings regarding lawlessness 
and intimidation of citizens by gang members, and that ordinarily such a law which 
directly prohibited such conduct would be constitutional.32  However, Chicago’s law 
indirectly covered an amount of additional activity such as innocent loitering and is 
therefore too vague.33 
While the ordinance does not impair a gang member’s First Amendment right of 
association, Justice Stevens argued that the freedom to loiter is part of the liberty 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  “We have 
expressly identified this ‘right to remove from one place to another according to 
inclination’ as ‘an attribute of personal liberty’ protected by the Constitution.”34  It 
was apparent that “an individual’s decision to remain in a public place of his choice 
is as much a part of his liberty as the freedom of movement . . . that is ‘a part of our 
heritage.’”35 
Instead of focusing on these protected liberties, however, Stevens placed more 
emphasis on the fact that the ordinance was vague on its face.36  Vagueness of a 
                                                                
28Id. at 62. 
29Id. 
30Id. at 63.  In terms of who and what conduct is covered under the ordinance, Justice 
Stevens based much of his determination that the ordinance is vague on the Illinois Supreme 
Court’s failure to place any limiting interpretations on it.  See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 
U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (the United States Supreme Court is bound by the state Supreme Court’s 
construction of a statute).  As a result, the court took the statute at face value and “assume[d] 
that the ordinance means what it says . . .”  Morales, 527 U.S. at 63. 
31Id. at 64. 
32Id. at 51-52.  Justice Stevens pointed out that the city has already enacted valid 
ordinances that serve this purpose.  See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 720 § 5/12-6 (1998) 
(Intimidation); ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 720 § 570/405.2 (Streetgang criminal drug conspiracy); 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 720 § 147/1 et seq. (Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention 
Act). 
33Morales, 527 U.S. at 52. 
34Id. at 53 (quoting Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1990)). 
35Id. at 54 (quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958)). 
36Id. at 55.  Under the overbreadth doctrine, laws may be invalidated that inhibit the 
exercise of First Amendment rights (such as the freedom to loiter) if the impermissible 
applications of the law are substantial when “judged in relation to the statute’s plainly 
legitimate sweep.”  Broderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-15 (1973).  The Court 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss1/18
2000] THE GANG’S ALL HERE:  ANTI-LOITERING LAWS 221 
statute may invalidate a criminal law for either one of two independent reasons; first 
by failing to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand 
what conduct it prohibits; and second by authorizing arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.37  Justice Stevens analyzed the Chicago ordinance in light of these 
requirements in Part IV of his opinion, still joined only by Justices Souter and 
Ginsburg. 
The term “loiter,” defined by the city ordinance as “to remain in any one place 
with no apparent purpose,” does not have a common and accepted meaning 
according to Justice Stevens.38   
It is difficult to imagine how any citizen of the city of Chicago standing in 
a public place with a group of people would know if he or she had an 
‘apparent purpose.’  If she were talking to another person, would she have 
an apparent purpose?  If she were frequently checking her watch and 
looking expectantly down the street, would she have an apparent 
purpose?39   
Although loiterers are not subject to sanction until after they fail to comply with a 
dispersal order, Due Process requires that citizens have fair notice to conform his or 
her conduct to the law.  A dispersal order by a police officer that can be provided 
only after the prohibited conduct has already occurred cannot “retroactively” act as a 
substitute for adequate notice.40  Furthermore, according to Justice Stevens, the order 
to “disperse and remove themselves from the area” compounds the vagueness of the 
statute.  “After such an order issues, how long must the loiterers remain apart?  How 
far must they move?  If each loiterer walks around the block and they meet again at 
the same location, are they subject to arrest or merely to being ordered to disperse 
again?”41 
Justice Stevens did, however, concede that imprecision in a statute does not 
necessarily render it unconstitutional.  The deficiency in the Chicago ordinance, 
though, was not that it required a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise 
normative standard, but rather because no standard of conduct was specified at all.42  
This, in itself, was sufficient to invalidate the loitering ordinance. 
                                                          
bypassed this approach, instead relying on the vagueness doctrine which allows for 
invalidation of laws that fail to establish standards for the police and public that are sufficient 
to guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests.  See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 
U.S. 352, 358 (1983). 
37Morales, 527 U.S. at 56.  See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357. 
38Morales, 527 U.S. at 56. 
39Id. at 57. 
40Id. at 59. 
41Id. 
42Id. at 60. 
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B.  Justice O’Connor’s Concurrence: Alternative Approaches43 
Justice O’Connor agreed with the holding that the loitering ordinance is 
unconstitutionally vague because it fails to inform ordinary citizens what conduct is 
prohibited and fails to establish guidelines to prevent arbitrary enforcement.44  
Because any person standing on a street corner has a general “purpose,” the 
ordinance permits police officers to choose which purposes are permissible and gives 
officers unwielding discretion in ordering persons to disperse regardless if the person 
is a gang member or not.45  Thus, Justice O’Connor agreed with Justice Stevens’ 
plurality opinion in that regard.  
Justice O’Connor, however, placed strong emphasis on the narrow scope of the 
holding, suggesting that there are reasonable alternatives available to Chicago to 
combat the threat posed by gang members such as laws that prohibit the presence of 
a large collection of obviously lawless gang members that intimidate citizens.  
Indeed, the city already had several ordinances which addressed this issue.46  
Additionally, Justice O’Connor suggested that the statute as it is presently written 
may have survived constitutional scrutiny had the Illinois Supreme Court applied a 
limiting construction to the ordinance such as narrowing what an officer may 
interpret as “no apparent purpose.”47  Unfortunately, the state court misapplied 
Supreme Court precedent by holding the ordinance vague in all its applications 
because it was intentionally drafted in a vague manner.48  According to Justice 
O’Connor, the U.S. Supreme Court has never held that the intent of the drafters 
determines whether a law is vague.  A state supreme court may impose limiting 
constructions to a statute in order to make it constitutional, but because the Illinois 
Supreme Court failed to adopt such a construction, the U.S. Supreme Court is 
powerless to adopt one on its own.49  Therefore, the ordinance could not be upheld. 
C.  Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence: Notice for Ordinary Citizens 
Justice Kennedy expressed the same concerns as Justices Stevens and O’Connor 
regarding the sufficiency of notice under the ordinance and how it would reach a 
broad range of innocent conduct.  And the fact that a dispersal order must be 
disobeyed before a person is in violation did not save the ordinance.50 
                                                                
43Morales, 527 U.S. at 64.  Justice O’Connor’s opinion was joined by Justice Stevens. 
44Id. at 64-65 (O=Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
45Id. at 66. 
46ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 720 ' 5/12-6 (1998) (Intimidation); ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 720 
§ 570/405.2 (Streetgang criminal drug conspiracy); ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 720 § 147/1 et seq. 
(Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act); ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 720 § 5/25-1 
(Mob action). 
47Morales, 527 U.S. at 68 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
48Id.  See Papachristou, 405 U.S. 156. 
49Morales, 527 U.S. at 68. 
50Id. at 69 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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Notice, however, is not always required before a citizen may be prosecuted for 
disobeying a police order.  Examples proffered by Justice Kennedy include “when 
the police tell a pedestrian not to enter a building and the reason is to avoid impeding 
a rescue team, or to protect a crime scene, or to secure an area for the protection of a 
public official.”51  Yet, it does not necessarily follow that any unexplained police 
order must be obeyed without notice of the lawfulness of the order.  “The predicate 
of an order to disperse is not . . . sufficient to eliminate doubts regarding the 
adequacy of notice under this ordinance.”52  But because a citizen may not know 
when he might be subject to a dispersal order or may not be able to “assess what an 
officer might conceive to be the citizen’s lack of an apparent purpose,” the ordinance 
fails constitutional scrutiny.53 
D.  Justice Breyer’s Concurrence: Too much discretion for police 
Justice Breyer agreed with Justice Stevens that the fact that non-gang members as 
well as gang members alike are subject to the strictures of the ordinance makes the 
ordinance constitutionally suspect.  Furthermore, he agreed that the “no apparent 
purpose” requirement is vague because everyone has an “apparent purpose.”54  
However, he disagreed with the other justices on this issue of notice to citizens under 
the ordinance.  The issue for Justice Breyer was not how ordinary citizens are 
expected to be guided (i.e. lack of notice), but rather how police officers are to be 
guided under the ordinance.55  
For Justice Breyer, the fear is not that officers may apply their discretion poorly 
in particular situations, but that “the policeman enjoys too much discretion in every 
case.”56  If every “application of the ordinance represents an exercise of unlimited 
discretion, then the ordinance is invalid in all its applications.”57  A city is free to 
prevent people through reasonably specific ordinances from conducting themselves 
in manners annoying to the public.  However, a city cannot do so “through the 
enactment and enforcement of an ordinance whose violation may entirely depend 
upon whether or not a policeman is annoyed.”58  If the city had adopted an ordinance 
that directly addressed specific instances of gang intimidation or if the Illinois 
Supreme Court would have interpreted the present ordinance differently (such as 
                                                                
51Id. 
52Id.  The actual text of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is cryptic indeed, so much so that 
this statement regarding the “predicate of an order” caused Justice Scalia to remark in his 
dissent, “I have not the slightest idea what this means.”  Id. at 88 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
53Morales, 527 U.S. at 69-70. 
54Id. at 70 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
55Id.  Justice Breyer joined Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in this regard. 
56Id. at 71. 
57Id. 
58Morales, 527 U.S. at 72 (quoting Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (in 
which the Court declared facially unconstitutional on the due process standard of vagueness an 
ordinance that prohibited persons assembled on a sidewalk from annoying passers by)). 
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providing limiting constructions as Justice O’Connor suggested), it would have 
survived in Justice Breyer’s view.59 
E.  The Plurality in Perspective 
Ultimately, nothing groundbreaking can be gained from the several opinions.  For 
example, even though several justices advocated creating a fundamental right to 
loiter, this position garnered only the support of a plurality of justices.  And the 
position that did gain majority support was merely a reaffirmation of what courts and 
commentators have already stressed.  That is, vagueness analysis should focus more 
on limiting arbitrary and discriminatory  police enforcement, as opposed to 
guaranteeing fair notice to the hypothetical defendant.  However, even though 
several positions never gained majority support, the dissenting opinions still 
challenged the plurality on its points. 
F.  Justice Scalia: Overreaching by the Court 
In one of his typical fiery dissents, the ever-colorful Justice Scalia took issue with 
three of the factors relied upon by the justices to invalidate the ordinance: (1) that 
there is a constitutionally protected right to loiter, (2) that the criminal ordinance 
contains no mens rea requirement, and (3) that the ordinance is vague.60 
With respect to a “constitutional right” to loiter,  Justice Scalia argued that every 
activity, even scratching one’s head, can be called a “constitutional right,” and using 
the term in that sense utterly impoverishes the Court’s constitutional discourse when 
such a term has been typically applied to such notions as religious worship or 
political speech.61  Justice Scalia relied heavily on Justice Thomas’s recounting of 
the historical tradition in which such loitering activity was frequently criminalized.  
Scalia contended that the right to loiter could not have been regarded as an essential 
attribute of liberty at the time of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Instead, 
the plurality discounts these historical practices as “nothing more than a speed bump 
on the road to the ‘right’ result.”62 
As for the concurring opinions, Justice Scalia likewise pulled no punches in 
lambasting them.  Justice O’Connor’s and Justice Breyer’s concurrences suggested 
that no police officer may constitutionally issue a dispersal order unless the standards 
for the issuance of that order are precise.  Yet according to Justice Scalia, no modern 
                                                                
59Id. at 73. 
60Before Justice Scalia debated the plurality’s interpretation of the ordinance, he argued 
that federal courts have no business invalidating statutes in all of their applications.  Relying 
on early historical and philosophical precedent, Justice Scalia found it fundamentally 
incompatible for the Court “not to be content to find that a statute is unconstitutional as 
applied to the person before it, but to go further and pronounce that the statute is 
unconstitutional in all its applications.”  Id. at 77 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  “I think it quite 
improper . . . to ask the constitutional claimant before us:  Do you just want us to say that this 
statute cannot constitutionally be applied to you in this case, or do you want to go for broke 
and try to get the statute pronounced void in all its applications?”  Id.  Such a policy, 
according to Justice Scalia, results in mere advisory opinions to which the Court has no 
business issuing.  Id. 
61Morales, 527 U.S. at 84 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
62Id. 
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society, “and probably none since London got big enough to have sewers,” could 
function under such a rule.63  There are innumerable and unpredictable reasons why a 
police officer may require a person to “move on,” but “to say that such a general 
ordinance permitting ‘lawful orders’ is void in all its applications demands more than 
a safe and orderly society can reasonably deliver.”64 
Justice Scalia next challenged the second factor relied on by the plurality to 
invalidate the ordinance, namely that it contains no mens rea requirement.  First, he 
rejected the contention that the actus reus involves “loitering.”  According to Justice 
Scalia, it is not the act of loitering which subjects a person to criminal liability.  
More so, that activity is not even a condition for the issuance of a dispersal order.65  
Rather, the only act that is punishable or even mentioned under the ordinance is the 
failure to promptly obey.  It necessarily follows that this actus reus, according to  
Justice Scalia, must be accompanied by some wrongful intent.66  “No one thinks a 
defendant could be successfully prosecuted under the Ordinance if he did not hear 
the order to disperse, or if he suffered a paralysis that rendered his compliance 
impossible.  The willful failure to obey a police order is wrongful intent enough.”67 
Justice Scalia finally attacked the third point, the proposition that the ordinance is 
vague.  According to him, what counts for purposes of vagueness is not what the 
ordinance is designed to prohibit, but what it actually subjects to criminal penalty.  If 
the mere order to disperse is by itself unconstitutionally vague, then it would render 
unconstitutional “many of the Presidential proclamations issued under that provision 
of the United States Code which requires the President, before using the militia or 
the Armed Forces for law enforcement, to issue a proclamation ordering the 
insurgents to disperse.”68 
Even so, the criteria for issuing a dispersal order are hardly vague, according to 
Justice Scalia.  The necessary prerequisite to a dispersal is the reasonable belief that 
one person is a gang member based explicitly on probable cause, a traditional 
requirement for all law enforcement officers regarding any crime.69  Furthermore, 
and contrary to Justice O’Connor’s assertion that the ordinance applies to persons 
standing in one place, Justice Scalia notes that the ordinance applies to persons 
remaining in one place, which in this context means to endure or persist.70  And 
police officers are not looking for anyone with no apparent purpose (as Justice 
                                                                
63Id. at 87. 
64Id. 
65Id. at 89 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
66Morales, 527 U.S. at 89 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
67Id. 
68Id. at 90-91.  For example, President Eisenhower’s proclamation relating to racial 
integration in public schools in Little Rock, Arkansas, read: “I . . . command all persons 
engaged in such obstruction of justice to cease and desist therefrom, and to disperse 
forthwith.”  Presidential Proclamation No. 3204, 3 C.F.R. § 132 (1954-1958 Comp.).   
69Morales, 527 U.S. at 92. 
70Id. at 93. 
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O’Connor suggested), but are looking for people who remain in one place for no 
apparent reason for remaining there, a fundamentally different notion.71 
Justice Scalia concluded by stating that “in our democratic system, how much 
harmless conduct to proscribe is not a judgment to be made by the courts.”  All sorts 
of perfectly harmless and innocent activities can and have been forbidden such as 
riding a bicycle without a helmet or starting a campfire in a park because of the harm 
that they entail.72  Similarly, “citizens of Chicago have decided . . . [to] depriv[e] 
themselves of the freedom to ‘hang out’ with . . . gang member[s]” in order to 
eliminate pervasive gang crime and intimidation.73  The Court, according to Justice 
Scalia, has no business second guessing this. 
G.  Justice Thomas: Chicagoans as Prisoners 
While Justice Scalia’s dissent was based primarily upon legal theory and 
precedent, Justice Thomas focused on the tradition and public policy implications 
which result from the plurality’s decision.  In his view, “the Court has unnecessarily 
sentenced law-abiding citizens to lives of terror and misery.”74  Unlike the other 
Justices, Justice Thomas attempted to remove this issue from the isolated judges’ 
chambers and black letter precedent and analyze it within the real life context of how 
Chicagoans must deal with the situation of gangs everyday.  Citing extensive 
government reports, Justice Thomas was primarily concerned with the “human costs 
exacted by criminal street gangs” and how citizens are “relegat[ed] . . . to the status 
of prisoners in their own home.”75  For Justice Thomas, regardless of the background 
underlying the loitering ordinance, it survives the vagueness test on its face.76 
To suggest that the ordinance is vague because loitering is a liberty protected 
under the Fourteenth Amendment ignores the extensive history of anti-vagrancy 
laws, asserts Justice Thomas.77  “Laws permitting loitering and vagrancy have been a 
                                                                
71Id.  
72Id. at 97-98. 
73Id. at 98. 
74Morales, 527 U.S. at 98. (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Scalia joined in this opinion. 
75Id. at 99-101.  See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of 
Justice Assistance, Monograph: Urban Street Gang Enforcement 3 (1997) (noting how gangs 
“[v]irtually overtake certain neighborhoods, contributing to the economic and social decline of 
these areas and causing fear and lifestyle changes among law-abiding residents”); U.S. Dept. 
of Justice, Att’y Gen. Rep. to the President, Coordinated Approach to the Challenge of Gang 
Violence: A Progress Report 1 (Apr. 1996) (noting the “physically and psychologically 
debilitating” impact of gang intimidation); Martinez, Parents Paid to Walk Line Between 
Gangs and School, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 21, 1998, at 1 (Chicago Public Schools hiring 
adults to escort children to school); Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, Research 
Bulletin: Street Gangs and Crime 4 (Sept. 1996) (estimating 132 criminal street gangs in the 
City of Chicago); Chicago Police Department, Gang and Narcotic Related Violent Crime, City 
of Chicago: 1993-1997 (June 1998) (estimating that in 1996 alone gangs were involved in 225 
homicides, 28% of the total homicides committed in the City of Chicago). 
76Morales, 527 U.S. at 102. 
77Id. at 103. 
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fixture of Anglo-American law at least since the time of the Norman Conquest . . .” 
and it is insufficient “to rest on the proposition that antiloitering laws represent an 
anachronistic throwback to an earlier, less sophisticated era.”78  Justice Thomas 
criticized the plurality for relying on only three questionable cases to support the 
proposition of a constitutional right to loiter for innocent purposes, and only one of 
which―decided 100 years after the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment―addressed the validity of a vagrancy ordinance.79  Even so, that case, 
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,80 never compelled the notion that the 
Constitution protects the right to loiter for innocent purposes.  That case only 
included some dicta which failed to undertake the requisite analysis for determining 
whether a right is fundamental under the Due Process Clause.81  To now create that 
judge-made right absent any cognizable roots in the Constitution, according to 
Justice Thomas, the Court comes nearest to threatening its own legitimacy and 
should act in restraint.82  
Finally, Justice Thomas concludes by questioning the contention that the 
ordinance vests too much discretion in police officers by allowing them to disperse 
innocent people.  In his view, “by empowering them to act as peace officers, the law 
assumes that the police will exercise that discretion responsibly and with sound 
judgment.”83  Articulating precisely what probable cause and reasonable suspicion 
mean is not possible, but they are commonsense conceptions left to the officer who 
has been entrusted to make those determinations.  While objective guidelines are of 
course necessary, officers must still be left with adequate discretion.  The Chicago 
ordinance strikes a proper balance in Justice Thomas’s eyes.84 
IV.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF MORALES 
The plurality in Morales invalidated the Chicago Loitering Ordinance based on 
two main premises.  First, it found that the ordinance was vague, and second that it 
impinged on a constitutionally fundamental right to loiter.  Unfortunately, the 
justices were misguided in both of these considerations, either by misinterpreting 
precedent or by ignoring the practical effect of the ordinance.  Of the two issues, 
however, the plurality's reasoning with regard to creating a new fundamental right 
raises the greater concern because it is flawed and discounts judicial restraint. 
                                                                
78Id.  Justice Thomas goes into extensive detail regarding such laws, noting that the early 
American colonists criminalized loitering and that vagrancy laws were common in the decades 
preceding the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and also long thereafter.  For a 
general treatment, see C. RIBTON-TURNER, A HISTORY OF VAGRANTS AND VAGRANCY AND 
BEGGARS AND BEGGING (1972); Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 161-62. 
79Morales, 527 U.S. at 105. 
80405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
81Morales, 527 U.S. at 105. 
82Id. at 106. 
83Id. at 109. 
84Id. at 110. 
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A.  A Constitutional Right to Do Nothing 
In creating a due process right to loiter, the plurality misguidedly relied on dicta 
and unrelated precedent from earlier cases to suggest that such a right already existed 
prior to its ruling in Morales.  Justice Stevens wrote that the freedom to loiter for 
innocent purposes is part of the liberty protected by the Due Process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  “We have expressly identified this ‘right to remove from 
one place to another according to inclination’ as ‘an attribute of personal liberty’ 
protected by the Constitution.”85  He went on to note that liberty of movement has 
long been a part of our heritage.86  The three cases relied upon by the plurality were 
Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900), Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), and 
Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).  Unfortunately, none of these 
cases lend support for an already existing fundamental right to loiter. 
In Williams, Georgia levied a specific tax on emigrant agents.  The tax was 
challenged on the ground that it interfered with the freedom of transit.  The Court 
upheld the tax, but nevertheless stated that “the right of locomotion, the right to 
remove from one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal 
liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of any 
state is a right secured by the Constitution.”87   
Similarly, Dulles involved a case in which U.S. citizens were denied passports 
for outgoing foreign travel because of their Communistic beliefs.  There, the Court 
also stated that the “right to travel is a part of the ‘liberty’ of which the citizen cannot 
be deprived without due process . . .”88  However, Williams or Dulles never once 
made reference to loitering.  Rather, those cases dealt solely with the long 
established fundamental right to travel, i.e., the right to change domicile and move 
freely among the different states.89  It is a concept wholly different than the “right” to 
wander without purpose on neighborhood streets.  Therefore, the plurality can find 
no support in these two cases. 
Papachristou also adds little support for the notion of a fundamental right to 
loiter.  That case involved the legitimacy of a Jacksonville anti-vagrancy ordinance.  
The Court struck down the ordinance solely on vagueness grounds, yet it continued 
on a poetic tangent about how “wandering or strolling” or similar activities are part 
of the amenities of life as we have known them and how they have “encouraged lives 
of high spirits rather than hushed, suffocating silence.”90  Even if this language could 
stand for the proposition of a right to loiter, the case had already been decided on the 
vagueness issue.  Therefore, this is mere dicta.  And it was improper for the plurality 
in Morales to insert this case at the end of a string cite as support for the right to 
loiter, especially considering that the other two cases cited, Williams and Dulles, lend 
less if not zero support for the proposition. 
                                                                
85Id. at 53. 
86Morales, 527 U.S. at 54. 
87Williams, 179 U.S. at 274. 
88Dulles, 357 U.S. at 125. 
89See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
90Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 164. 
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Nevertheless, it is not unusual nor is it necessarily inappropriate for courts to rely 
on dicta in expanding rights under the Constitution.  However, if the Morales 
plurality was going to create the right, it should have at a minimum gone through the 
requisite test.  Generally, the test which guides courts under substantive due process 
is whether the right is part of a “scheme of ordered liberty” or “rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people.”91  The plurality never employed this test.  
Instead, it simply announced the right in one small, passing paragraph. 
Even if the plurality did employ the test, history shows that the right to loiter has 
never been a part of tradition.  In his dissent, Justice Thomas cited numerous anti-
vagrancy statutes enacted since colonial times, several of which have remained on 
the books since the 1960’s.92  In response to this, Justice Stevens countered that just 
because these laws have been on the books, that does not ensure their 
constitutionality.  However, Justice Stevens makes a straw man argument, citing 
only the 16th century English “Slavery Acts” and one 1865 post-Civil War act as 
evidence for the proposition that all of the multitude of anti-vagrancy acts cited by 
Justice Thomas may not have been constitutional.93  Even accepting Stevens’ point, 
this does not provide any affirmative support for the proposition that loitering has 
been a part of our history and traditions.  The only affirmative evidence cited is the 
three cases.  And as discussed above, those cases, Williams, Dulles, and 
Papachristou, lend little to no support for a right to loiter.  Therefore, the plurality 
was incorrect in creating this new substantive right. 
B.  The Vagueness Debate 
The other impression emerging from the several opinions is the notion that 
poorly worded statutes will be struck down.  In Morales, the Court struck down the 
Chicago loitering ordinance for vagueness, yet it implied that more precision would 
have saved it.  The resulting debate then becomes exactly how much precision is 
required.  Vagueness analysis concerns a balancing of considerations.  As 
commentators have suggested, courts should consider “the need for the statutory 
ambiguity to achieve a significant legislative goal, weighed against the chilling effect 
of the ambiguity on protected or desirable conduct.”94  Unfortunately, the plurality in 
Morales placed too much weight on the side of protecting desirable conduct, as a 
result eviscerating any chance of Chicago achieving its legislative goal. 
The plurality struck down the Chicago ordinance on vagueness grounds because 
it 1) failed to guarantee fair notice to the hypothetical defendant and 2) failed to limit 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.  However, as Justice O’Connor and other 
courts have correctly noted, vagueness analysis should focus more on the second 
                                                                
91Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).  While most justices adhere to this 
view, Justice Scalia advocates a more stringent approach.  He suggests that while courts 
should look to tradition, it must be the most concrete and specific notion of history.  See 
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
92Morales, 527 U.S. at 104 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
93Id. at 54 n.20. 
94See Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Construction of Criminal Statutes C Balancing 
Acts, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1 (Fall 1997). 
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prong of the test (limiting arbitrary and discriminatory  enforcement).95  No doubt, 
the nature of loitering ordinances can lead to the harassment of many innocent 
youths.96  Additionally, ambiguously phrased criminal statutes give much discretion 
to officers to make arrests which can inflict damage on the mind, pocketbook and 
reputation of the person regardless of any judicial acquittals.97  Therefore, any 
attempts at drafting constitutional anti-loitering statutes which still sufficiently 
balance the competing interests of necessity versus protected liberties should pay 
attention to this concern. 
Unfortunately, prior courts that have invalidated anti-loitering statutes have not 
offered many suggestions on how to draft a narrower statute while still satisfying 
legislative goals.98  The plurality in Morales could not do much better.  Of the 
several opinions in Morales, Justice O’Connor’s opinion was the only one that 
attempted to provide concrete examples of how the Chicago ordinance could have 
been reworked to survive a vagueness challenge.  However, even her suggestions are 
either unworkable in practice or were already satisfied by the Chicago ordinance. 
O’Connor suggested that the gang loitering ordinance could have survived if 
applied only to gang members “or . . . more carefully delineated the circumstances in 
which those penalties would apply to nongang members.”99  The problem with this is 
that gangs do not consist of card-carrying, easily identifiable members.  It is not 
necessarily possible to correctly determine if someone is a member of a gang or not.  
An alternative to this which was alluded to by Justice O’Connor is to add a 
reasonableness requirement.  “If the ordinance applied only to persons reasonably 
believed to be gang members, this requirement might have cured the ordinance’s 
vagueness because it would have directed the manner in which the order was issued 
by specifying to whom the order could be issued.”100  However, what O’Connor 
failed to realize is that the Chicago ordinance in practice did precisely that. 
The Chicago Gang Congregation Ordinance did already provide safeguards 
against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by requiring officers to reasonably 
suspect a person is a gang member before any dispersal orders could issue.  
According to Chicago Police Department objective guidelines, as required to be 
established by the ordinance, gang members were to be identified based on crime 
pattern information, surveillance results, witness interviews, admissions of street 
gang members, and specific identifiable marks such as suggestive colors, tattoos, and 
markings ordinarily used by street gang members.101  Furthermore, only members of 
the gang crime section and other specially designated personnel could make arrests 
                                                                
95See Morales, 527 U.S. at 65 (O=Connor, J., concurring).  See also Lawson, 461 U.S. at 
357-58; Batey, supra note 94, at 2. 
96See Warren Friedman, Wasted Opportunities?, 4 NEIGHBORHOODS 2 (Fall 1998). 
97See Batey, supra note 94, at 6. 
98See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983).  See also, John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., 
Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 211 (1985); 
Batey, supra note 94, at 14. 
99Morales, 527 U.S. at 68. 
100Id. at 66. 
101See Chicago Police Department, General Order 92-4. 
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under the ordinance.102  Under these guidelines, the suggestion that any police officer 
can arbitrarily order innocent people to disperse would appear misguided.  
Unfortunately, these guidelines failed to sway the Court because it has been well 
established that a legislature cannot delegate its powers for setting the standards of a 
criminal statute.103  Therefore, O’Connor, as well as the rest of the plurality should 
have simply suggested that the Chicago legislature codify these guidelines within the 
ordinance itself.  Under these requirements, the notion that a person “waiting to hail 
a taxi,” resting on a corner during a jog, or “stepping into a doorway to evade a rain 
shower” would be arrested under this statute is ludicrous at best.104 
As another possibility to save the ordinance, Justice O’Connor suggested that the 
term “loiter” could have been construed in a more limited fashion “to remain in any 
one place with no apparent purpose other than to establish control over identifiable 
areas, to intimidate others from entering those areas, or to conceal illegal 
activities.”105  However, these motives are too difficult to determine with 
particularity.  The plurality apparently had issues under the Chicago ordinance as to 
how an officer could adequately determine if someone has no apparent purpose, but 
attempting to identify specific purposes such as those listed by O’Connor would be 
even more difficult.  Even so, as an alternative safeguard to statutorily identifying 
particular motives, the upper and lower courts would be able to provide checks 
against arbitrary enforcement and formulate the limits to anti-loitering statutes and 
provide safeguards against abuses of discretion.   
For example, in Terry v. Ohio,106 the Court granted police officers absolute 
discretion to stop ordinary citizens and frisk them if the officer reasonably suspects 
that a person is likely to commit a crime.107  The Terry Court bypassed the Fourth 
Amendment’s requirement that searches be conducted with a warrant and instead 
adopted a reasonableness balancing test not unlike the balancing tests used in other 
vagueness case analysis.  Because the interests in safety and crime prevention 
outweighed the right to privacy, officers were given the discretion to conduct 
warrantless searches based solely on reasonable suspicion, a standard less demanding 
than probable cause.108  Similarly, the Chicago City Council apparently also found it 
necessary to give officers leeway to adequately protect law-abiding citizens from the 
actual threat posed by gangs.  Abuses with Terry searches were possible, but they 
                                                                
102Id. 
103See Smith v. Gougen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974). 
104Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 61.  These were some hypothetical examples proffered by the 
Illinois Supreme Court.   
105Morales, 527 U.S. at 68. 
106392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
107In Terry, an officer observed two men pacing back and forth, examining a store 
window.  After each trip, the men would confer briefly and then repeat the ritual.  According 
to the Court, that gave the officer reasonable suspicion that the men were contemplating a 
robbery and as such, the officer was able to conduct a constitutional stop and frisk.  392 U.S. 
at 27-29.  
108Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-26. 
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were eventually corrected by the courts through individual ad hoc cases.109  This is 
the same approach that Justice Scalia advocates in his dissent, suggesting that the 
constitutionality of the Chicago ordinance should only be determined as it applies to 
individual cases, not determined how it may apply hypothetically to any situation.110   
As an example of subsequent limitations to Terry seizures, the Supreme Court in 
Minnesota v. Dickerson limited the scope of such searches by requiring that any 
contraband seized during the search be readily apparent to the officer.111  Officers 
were restricted from conducting limitless searches solely because they lawfully 
stopped a person.  Furthermore, state courts have placed limits on when an officer 
can conduct an initial stop of a suspicious person.  In Ohio v. Bobo,112 the Ohio 
Supreme Court noted that any Terry stops must be viewed in light of the totality of 
circumstances, including time of day, the specific neighborhood, and the officer’s 
experience.113  The same would be true with loitering ordinances.  The courts could 
establish the boundaries limiting officers charged with enforcing such ordinances.  In 
fact, Justice O’Connor noted in her concurrence that the Chicago anti-loitering 
ordinance would have survived had the Illinois Supreme Court placed a limiting 
instruction on the law. 
 Allowing lower courts on an ad hoc basis to determine the validity of anti-
loitering statutes and eventually setting court established limits as has been done 
with Terry stops would result in the upholding of many statutes.  But this is just an 
added safeguard.  The Chicago Ordinance, through its required enforcement 
guidelines, already provided sufficient safeguards against arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement and thus should have been upheld in Morales. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Scholars have concluded that crime can most effectively be combated when 
police address the signs of visible disorder that destabilize communities and 
stimulate more serious crimes.114  As a result, commentators and citizens alike have 
called for courts to provide greater leeway for governments to address the chronic 
disorder permeating city streets.115  To be sure, upholding the Chicago Loitering 
Ordinance would have been a step in this direction.  Additionally, requiring the 
codification of Chicago’s police guidelines should have been enough to prevent 
                                                                
109See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) (limiting the scope of Terry 
seizures to that contraband readily apparent). 
110See Morales, 527 U.S. at 74 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
111Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993). 
112524 N.E.2d 489 (Ohio 1988). 
113Id. at 491. 
114See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 
Mar. 1982, at 33-38. 
115See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of 
Panhandlers, Skid Rows and Public Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1177-84, 1238-46 
(1996); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 
349, 389-94 (1997); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public 
Places: Courts, Communities and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 650-72 (1997). 
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arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.  Instead, the Court forced the Chicago City 
Council to start over again with little practical guidance as to how to draft a 
constitutional ordinance.  Furthermore, the plurality’s creation of a fundamental right 
to loiter, if adhered to by future courts, may soon rubberstamp a presumption of 
unconstitutionality on all loitering statutes.  Fortunately, that position did not gain 
majority support.  O’Connor’s specific suggestions for how to draft a constitutional 
ordinance are further evidence that the death knell has not been sounded for all 
loitering statutes.  But in the meantime, Chicago is left with one less means for 
battling gang domination of its city streets. 
ROBERT DELCHIN 
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